

### **E-LASS Conference**

October 10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup>, 2017, Pula

# DESIGN OF CAR DECKS WITH COMPOSITE PANELS INTRODUCED ON A 7000 CARS CAR CARRIER



Vito Radolović (ULJANIK) Michael Rahm (RISE)



### **Contents**

- Introduction
- Background
- Design
  - Rules and regulation requirements
  - Additional assesment
- Production
- Conclusion
- Follow up projects







### Introduction









### **Background**





**DELIGHT TRANSPORT** - Cargo deck of composite materials for RO-RO vessels (FP6-031483, 2006-2010)


### **DESIGN OPTIMISATION, PROTOTYPE AND TESTING**

- ➤ Deck structure weight reduction up to 35%
- $\triangleright$  Fuel consumption reduction up to 2%  $\rightarrow$  CO2 emission reduction
- ➤ Total Lifecycle operation cost savings
- Production process cost reduction
- > Satisfactory test results




















### "Composite decks" on a SOLAS vessel

### Car carrier - 7000 cars



#### MAIN PARTICULARS:

LENGTH overallmax	200.00	m
LENGTH b.p	_188.70	m
BREADTH moulded	32.26	m
DEPTH to upper deck moulded	32.12	m
DRAUGHT design	8.00	m
DRAUGHT scantling	8.80	m
DEADWEIGHT at design draugth	_13 370	t
DEADWEIGHT at scantling draugth	17 170	t
MAIN ENGINE M.A.N B & W - ULJANIK 7 S	50 ME-B	9.5
OUTPUT MCR11 200 kW	/ 117 r.p	.m.
SPEED trial ( 9520 kW at draught design )	19.7 km	ots

Classification society: Bureau Veritas

Flag: Liberia







### **Design prcedure**

### Requirements:

- Owner
- Class
- SOLAS
  - Construction
  - Fire safety

→ Conventional or Alternative design procedure ?









### "Composite decks" on a SOLAS vessel

#### **SOLAS - CONSTRUCTION**

- ➤ SOLAS/Ch.II-2/Reg.11 (Structural integrity)
  - > Longitudinal and ultimate strength analysis is done without participation of composite panels, only steel part considered
  - Local structural design is done to ensure that any type of car can hold their position in case of any composite panel failure
- → Structural integrity is fully ensured by steel members → SOLAS compliant




COMPOSITE PANEL – covering the openings in the steel grillage



Conventional design procedure

→ Additional supports










### "Composite decks" on a SOLAS vessel

#### **SOLAS - FIRE SAFETY**

- ➤ SOLAS/Ch.II-2/Reg.9(Containment of fire)
  - ➤ Composite decks are within same fire zone bounded by steel gastight structure → no fire protection requirements by SOLAS → SOLAS compliant
- ➤ CLASS: no requirement additional to SOLAS









### Design procedure

### WORK DONE ACCORDING TO RULES&REGULATIONS REQUIREMENTS

- Structure design
  - > Steel grillage
  - Composite panels
- Firefighting and fire detection system
- Outfit design
  - Cargo Lashing on the composite panel

# ADDITIONAL ASSESMENT – owner requirement, was not required by rules&regulations

- Fire safety assesment done by independent company (RISE)
  - > Two HAZID workshops
  - preliminary analysis in qualitative terms
  - ➤ Large scale fire tests (steel and composite deck structure)
  - quantitative analysis 12 FDS simulations performed (6 steel & 6 composite)
- Improvements of the deck design according to fire safety assesment results

SOLAS compliant vessel with respect to Fire safety according to SOLAS "Alternative design procedure"








### Composite sandwich panel design


#### Composite sandwich panel optimisation :

- Number of glass fiber layers and fiber direction optimisation
- Core type analisys (PVC, PET, PUR)
- after selection of the core type
  - →Core layout optimisation
  - → different properies at specific locations (PVC80 and PVC100 used)

### FEA according to BV Rules



NAME	LOAD AT	AXLE LOAD (t)	TYRE PRINT (mm)	HOMMOGENOUS LOADING (t/m2)
PRIVATE CAR	SEA	L=4.8 m B=1.9 m	0.531	0.20










### Composite sandwich panel design


#### PANEL OUTFITTING: CARGO LASHING

**INITIAL VERSION** 



#### **FINAL VERSION**

- •improved according to fire test results
- lashing opening closed with steel plate














### **Composite sandwich panel production**

### **IMPLEMETATION ON CAR CARRIER / 7000 cars**


1043 composite panels installed on three upper decks (glass fibers, PVC Core, vacuum infusion,...)

















### Composite sandwich panel production



FIBER CONTENT M=74.2 %

200 tests (1000 specimens)

PANEL WEIGHT =155 kg TOTAL 162 t (1043 pcs)










### "Composite decks" –Steel grillage production















### "Composite decks" on a SOLAS vessel



Flexible bolt connection

Total building tolerance at each connection

+-5 mm







### "Composite decks" on a SOLAS vessel



- Total area covered by composite structure: 12600 m2  $\rightarrow$ 2.5 football field
- Total Weight reduction of **230** t
- Steel weight reduction of 390 t →equal to the weight of one conventional steel deck
- Improved stability performance
  - → Reduced balasst weight in double bottom tanks 2.5x weight reduction or **575** t

### Summary:

- Increased cargo intake for 230 t +575 t = 805 t
- Or reduced fuel consumption for 4.5% (2.1 t/day) and CO2 emmisions for same cargo intake


"lowest fuel consumption per CEU of any PCTC in its class"







# Life cycle










# Life cycle




















### Fire safety assessment

- Background
- Advantages/disadvantages of the design
- Performance criteria
- Fire tests
- FDS-simulations
- Evacuation analysis
- Results









### **Background**

- Flag considered the design compliant to prescriptive requirements
- Fire safety assessment performed for further demonstration of sufficient safety
- Assessment performed according to MSC/Circ.1002







### Advantages/disadvantages of the design in case of fire

### **Advantages**

- Delayed fire spread through decks
  - Insulating material
  - Closed lashing holes delays vertical fire spread
- Escape routs can be over the panels in case of fire below deck
- Global structural integrity depends on the steel part of structure
- Cargo safety
  - Cargo Lashing functionality

### Disadvantages

- Increased fire growth rate
- increased fire load
- structural integrity of the panel
- Toxicity; burning PVC creates hydrochloride.







#### Performance criteria

- Safe evacuation (at dock)
  - Fire risk is measured in expected fatalities due to a superstructure fire
  - One fatality = a person exposed to untenable conditions
  - Average risk presented as Expected Fatalities per Fire in gastight zone C (EFF).
- Structural integrity (at sea)
  - Probability of integrity loss and expected time is analyzed for all relevant end events.
  - The risk measure is presented as a weighted expected time to integrity loss.
  - $\frac{1}{\sum \frac{Probability\ of\ integrity\ loss}{Time\ to\ integrity\ loss}}$
- Containment of fire (at sea)
  - Probability of containment failure and expected time is analyzed for all relevant end events.
  - The risk measure is presented as a weighted expected time to containment failure.
  - $\frac{1}{\sum \frac{Probability\ of\ containment\ loss}{Time\ to\ containment\ loss}}$







### Fire tests

Performed to evaluate differences regarding:

- Fire growth rate
- Vertical fire spread

#### Steel deck:





















### Fire tests

Performed to evaluate differences regarding:

- Fire growth rate
- Vertical fire spread

#### FRP deck:



















### Fire tests - Observations

Observation	Time for observation		
	Test 1, Steel	Test 2, FRP FR- coated	Test 3, FRP
Smoke from the tyres on the deck	04:54	03:54	03:26
Flames through lashing holes	08:45	04:12	05:30
Ignition of first tyre	09:41	05:22	06:06
All tyres are burning	10:21	06:26	06:09
Lashing ropes ignites	10:51	Not established	N.A.








#### Fire tests - HRR

- HRR Steel deck:
   Measured HRR (oxygen consumption calorimetry) from the test with the steel deck
- HRR FRP deck: Measured HRR from the test with the uncoated FRP
- Medium:
   Medium fire growth, representing car
   fire on steel deck. Will be used as
   design fire in steel case in the
   simulations.
- Design fire:
   Based on measured HRR in these tests and earlier experience with vertical fire spread. Will be used as design fire in FRP case in the simulations.











**FDS Simulations – The model** 











#### **FDS Simulations**

18 simulations were performed, varying:

- Fire growth rate (steel/FRP)
- Ventilation conditions
  - Land/sea scenario
  - Time to close vents
- Fire origin deck
- Time to vertical fire spread (steel/FRP)








#### **FDS Simulations**

- Steel design
- Land scenario
- Fire start on deck 10










#### **FDS Simulations**

- Steel design
- Land scenario
- Fire start on deck 10










#### **FDS Simulations**

- Steel design
- Land scenario
- Fire start on deck 10










#### **FDS Simulations**

- Steel design
- Land scenario
- Fire start on deck 10










### **Steel beam temperatures**

- Gas temperatures taken from CFD simulations 40 cm above and below the deck closest to the fire.
- Homogene steel temperature.










### **Steel beam temperatures**

- Steel design
- Land scenario
- Fire start on deck 10










#### Fire spread to accomodation

- Gas temperatures taken from CFD simulations 40 cm below the deck right above, 2 decks above, and 3 decks above the initial fire.
- Fire spread is assumed to happen when  $\Delta T = 140$ °C which means T=160°C.
- Material properties for worst possible A30 deck used.
- No cooling on top of deck.










### Fire spread to accomodation

- Steel design
- Vents not closed
- Fire start on deck 12










### **Evacuation analysis**

ASET - RSET > 0

### <u>ASET = Available Safe Egress Time:</u>

- Time to untenable conditions in a compartment:
  - Visibility: 1,8 m above floor level the visibility must be more than 10 m.
  - Temperature: max 60°C
  - Toxicity: 1,8 m above floor level:
  - CO > 1400 ppm
  - $CO_2 > 5 \%$
  - O<sub>2</sub> < 15 %
  - HCL > 1000








### **Evacuation analysis**

ASET - RSET > 0

### RSET = Required Safe Egress Time:

- RSET (evacuation time)=recognition time + response time + movement time
  - Recognition time: 1-10 min depending on detection, position (what deck) and alertness
  - Response time: 1-5 min depending on detection, alertness, and if actual fire signatures are observed.
  - Moving time: 0.6 m walkways along ship side. 150 m distance (see fig). 1.2 m/s (corridors according to MSC/Circ.1033). ->2 minutes walking time









### **Results**

Criteria	Prescriptive design	Base design
PLL	0	0
Expected safety margin	20.5 min	13.5 min
Probability of structural integrity failure	12 %	51 %
Probability of loss of containment	10 %	10 %
Weighted average time to structural integrity failure	418 min	31 min
Weighted average time to containment failure	706 min	597 min







#### Trial alternative design 2

- New lashing hole design
  - Prolonged vertical fire spread
  - · Fire spread to deck below (burning droplets) eliminated
  - · Cargo lashing functional for longer time in fire scenario
- Automatic/remote controlled dampers
  - Fast closing (immediately after alarm); fire is ventilation controlled before structural damage and containment loss.
  - Reduced probability of failure (automatic functionality + manual effort in case of failure)
  - Faster CO<sub>2</sub>-activation
- Position feedback on doors and dampers
  - Allows crew to focus on failing doors and dampers
  - Reduces risk of CO<sub>2</sub> activation despite failing doors and dampers
- A30 insulation below lifeboat embarkation station
  - Allows safe lifeboat embarkation in case of uncontrolled fire in Gastight zone C







#### **Results**

Criteria	Prescriptive design	Base design	TAD2*
PLL	0	0	0
Expected safety margin	20.5	13.5	13.5
Probability of structural integrity failure	12 %	51 %	3 %
Probability of loss of containment	10 %	10 %	1 %
Weighted average time to structural integrity failure	418 min	31 min	552 min
Weighted average time to containment failure	706 min	597 min	5973 min

<sup>\*</sup>In addition: safer embarkation, earlier CO<sub>2</sub>-activation (less damaged cargo)







### Conclusion

### **SOLAS** compliant vessel with composite structure:

- ➤ Deck structure weight reduction of 25% (230 t)
- ➤ Increased cargo intake for 805 t or fuel consumption reduction of 4.5% (2.1 t/day HFO) for same cargo intake
- Production cost and lead time
- Improved safety of cargo in case of fire
- > Improved safety of crew in case of fire below deck with respect to Escape routs

SOLAS compliant vessel with respect to Fire safety according to SOLAS "Alternative design procedure"







### Further development at RAMSSES (WP14)

Project full title: Realisation and Demonstration of Advanced Material Solutions for Sustainable and Efficient Ships (Grant agreement No.:723246)



ULJANIK YARD 513 (Car Carrier 7000 cars) - to be used as base design where:

- -FRP structure design using the technology of Pultrusion
  - as a replacement of the sandwich composite panel



- as a replacement of the sandwich composite panel and steel supporting structure
- Combination of profiles and sandwich panel

Expected improvements: Improved flexibility in the design process, Production cost and lead time reduction, Joints development, Modular assembly of Composite components on board the ship















E-LASS Conference October 10<sup>th</sup> and 11st, 2017, Pula



### **Contacts**









45