

CONVINCE: Blast-resistance of three dimensional FRP-joints

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Plats för
projektsymbol

Survivability

- ***Susceptibility***
- ***Vulnerability Reduction***
- ***Recoverability***



The Visby Class Corvette

Survivability

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The Visby Class Corvette

Threat

”Survivability Map”

RISK

Tolerate engagement

Avoid engagement

Avoid weapon effects


Hard Kill
Soft Kill

Self Defence

External Support

Safe distance

Fight the threat



Weapons Effects Tolerance

RISK

Tolerate weapon effects

Avoid damage
Protect Functions

Redundancy
Separation
Concentration
Component hardening
Capacity
Damage containment

RISK

Recoverability

Tolerate damage
Recover Functions

Damage Control
Medical treatment
Repair function
Sea Rescue
External Support

Vulnerability

Susceptibility

Plats för
projektsymbol

Survivability

- **Susceptibility**
 - *Self Defence – Hard Kill /Soft Kill*
 - *Low Signatures / Stealth*
 - *Low Weight – High speed, Manouverability*
- **Vulnerability Reduction**
- **Recoverability**



The Visby Class Corvette

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
- 72 m
- 16 MW Gas turbines
- 40+ knots
- CFRP – sandwich
- Vacuum Infusion
- Launched year 2000
- 5 ships in service
- Etc.



The Visby Class Corvette

Survivability


- *Susceptibility*
- *Vulnerability Reduction*
 - *Resist Weapon Effects – Minimize Damage*
 - *Blast Pressure Wave*
 - *Fragments*
 - *Weapon Induced Fire*
- *Recoverability*



The Visby Class Corvette

Survivability


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

The Visby Class Corvette

Structural Limitations of "conventional" FRP-Sandwich structures with respect to blast vulnerability




- ✓ **Brittle behaviour** => No yielding
- ✓ **Low compression strength / Excellent tensile strength**
- ✓ **Low interlaminar strength** => Bulkhead to deck joints weak
- ✓ **Weak core**




- Continuous, blast resistant bulkheads working as membranes
- "Blow out" panels
- Box girders for global strength




- Continuous, blast resistant bulkheads working as membranes
- "Blow out" panels
- Box girders for global strength
- Continuous joints





Sweden: Lath joint fibre arrangement



EDA GEM1 Project CONVINCE - Vulnerability Reduction Technologies for Large Maritime Composite Structures

UK, FR, NL, IT, NO, SW


“vision of raising the resistance of **composites to withstand fire and blast** scenarios to levels **comparable with steel** while **maintaining the advantages of composites** compared to an equivalent metallic construction at acceptable platform cost such as: **weight reduction; enhanced stability margins; signature reduction**; etc, coupled with through life savings via such measures as **reduced fuel consumption**; through life platform flexibility and reduced ship maintenance”.


Total budget 8 400 000 € - 3 years 2011-2013

WPs	KTs		CET	OTO	ITM	CSI
WP0	0.1	Project management	x			
	0.2	Close technical co-ordination across all work packages	x			
	0.3	Definition of application case	x			
	0.4	Materials and Structure Identification	x			
	0.5	Understanding of threat definitions provided by TAMG	x			
	0.6	Thermal and Fire Insulations	x			
	0.7	Electro-Magnetic Signatures (EMS) Solutions		x		
	0.8	Affordability	x			
WP1: Fire engineering	1.0	WP coordination	x			
	1.1	Fire engineering methodology	x		x	x
	1.2	Fire safe concepts	x	x	x	x
	1.2.1	- Passive fire safety systems	x	x	x	x
	1.2.2	- Fire sensors and active fire safety systems				
	1.3	Manufacturing and testing			x	x
	1.3.1	- Manufacturing			x	
	1.3.2	- Testing				x
	1.4	Simulations	x			
	1.4.1	- Fire simulation				
	1.4.2	- Thermo mechanical behaviour	x			
WP 2: Blast Response of Marine Composites	1.5	Guidelines	x	x	x	x
	2.0	WP coordination	x			
	2.1	Definition of blast loading, fragment attack & other functional requirements	x	x		
	2.2	Simulation tools and Simulation	x			
	2.3	Structure, joint & panel design		x	x	
	2.4	Manufacture			x	
	2.5	Small Scale Blast Trials and Fragment Resistance		x		
	2.6	Large scale blast trials		x		
	2.7	Inspections & evaluation of residual behaviour (mechanical, fire and EMS)		x		x
	2.8	Guidelines	x	x	x	x



Two application cases

- (1) a 140m frigate with a composite superstructure
 - NSC Ship Type B acc. Ch.1 Reg.2 Para.1.38
 - expected DNV class notation 1A1 Naval
- (2) a 110m full composite large corvette
 - NSC Ship Type B(H) Ch.1 Reg.2 Para.1.38
 - The adapted HSC is only applicable to ships up to 100 m length and 100 persons onboard CH.VI Para.5 Table 0-1
 - expected DNV class notation 1A1 LC R1 Naval








SWE



NL



Remove by milling
after curing or:




NL/SWE

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BTF – Pendine test range



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CONVINCE

Publishable Executive Summary

VULNERABILITY REDUCTION TECHNOLOGIES FOR LARGE MARITIME COMPOSITE STRUCTURES

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End – Questions!